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I. INTRODUCTION
Tomasa Salinog remembers her rape at thirteen and her initiation into
Imperial Japan's system of "comfort stations."1 Japanese soldiers burst into
The author dedicates this Comment to her grandmothers Li Ru Jen and Tsaur Ruey Lin,
who taught her wisdom, strength and justice.
1. Her description of the events is set forth in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Judgment that Japan Cannot Claim Sovereign Immunity in
Defense of Claims of Systematic Sexual Slavery During World War II at 9, Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan,
172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 00-CV-2288) [hereinafter Pl.'s Mot for Declaratory J.] (citing
Plaintiff's Complaint 9, Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 00-CV-
2288) [hereinafter Pl.'s Compl.]).
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her home in the middle of the night, soon after the Japanese invasion of the
Philippines in 1942. They decapitated her father and removed her to a garrison
where two soldiers raped her and then beat her unconscious. After this
initiation, she served as a "comfort woman" in the garrison, used by Japanese
soldiers from the afternoon until late into the night, her body priced in blocks
of time allocated to each soldier.2 Hwang Geum Joo, who grew up in
Japanese-occupied Korea, remembers her "recruitment" differently. 3 When
she was nineteen, Emperor Hirohito purported to order all unmarried girls to
work in Japanese military factories. She reported to the train station where she
was packed into a Japanese military train carrying about fifty girls per car, and
taken to a troop station. There she was repeatedly raped for two weeks. Then
she was installed in a commodified rape center, euphemistically misnomered a
"comfort station," where she served thirty to forty soldiers on the average day.
She was also beaten daily. Like more than 200,000 other human commodities4
in Imperial Japan's system of pay-to-rape centers, both girls were priced
according to perceived racial inferiority. As a Korean, Hwang Geum Joo
fetched a higher price than Filipina Tomasa Salinog.6 The payments that the
soldiers made rarely went to the women, but were retained to pay for the
purported costs of cosmetics, housing, or "national security."7
Decades later, these women have yet to receive an admission or finding
of legal responsibility from the Japanese government, much less reparations. 8
In 2001, the women and other survivors brought suit in U.S. District Court
2. See YOSHIAKI YOSHM, COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE MEITARY
DURINO WORLD WAR I 60-61 (Suzanne O'Brien trans., 2000) (reporting interview with a Japanese
Army accounting officer who described learning at the army's accounting school how to set prices and
periods of use for each woman at the comfort stations based on a combination of her strength and the
purchasing officer's rank). This training of Army officers to run "comfort stations" is discussed in
greater detail in text accompanying infra note 37.
3. Pl.'s Mot. for Declaratory J., supra note 1, at 12 (citing PI.'s Compl. 7).
4. Update to the Final Report on Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual
Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
Subcommittee on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52d Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 6, at 17,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/2000/21 (2000) [hereinafter Update to the Final Report on Slavery]. The
update reported:
One of the most egregious documented cases of sexual slavery was the system of rape
camps associated with the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War. A
significant impetus for the creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur was the
increasing international recognition of the true scope and character of the harms
perpetrated against the more than 200,000 women and girls enslaved in so-called
"comfort stations" throughout Asia ... which in its totality constitutes crimes against
humanity.
Id.
5. CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION OF JAPAN'S WAR RESPONSIBILrrY, FIRST
REPORT ON THE ISSUE OF JAPAN'S MILITARY "COMFORT WOMEN"-HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY ON
THE ISSUE OF "MILITARY COMFORT WOMEN" 51 (1994) [hereinafter JAPAN's WAR RESPONSIBILITY].
6. Japanese comfort women fetched the highest price, but Korean comfort women
commanded the second highest price, followed by Chinese comfort women. Those of other nationalities
were considered racially inferior and priced accordingly. Id. at 51, 54, 56.
7. See YOSHIMv, supra note 2, at 142 (describing regulations governing how much of the
fees comfort women could retain, and noting that many women were unable to retain any sum because
of purported fees or required contributions).
8. See infra Section II.B for a discussion of both the stymied drive for reparations and justice
and a privately funded effort at compensation in response to an invitation by the Japanese government.
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against Japan under, inter alia, the commercial activity waiver to modify
foreign sovereign immunity in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The decision in Hwang
Geum Joo v. Japan9 derailed their effort, holding, inter alia, that state-
sponsored commodified rape and sexual slavery failed to qualify for the
commercial activity waiver of foreign sovereign immunity.' 0 This ruling is an
anomaly in light of the tests prescribed for commercial activity cases." This
Comment argues that the opinion's reasoning that forced prostitution is an
exercise of sovereign power rather than a brutal commodification of women's
bodies legitimizes an historial inequity in the proscription of slavery in
international law that U.S. courts today should not recognize.
Although multiple treaties prohibited slavery by the early twentieth
century, 12 separate conventions treated forced prostitution as distinct from
"slavery"'13 and considered it a "domestic" issue on which each sovereign state
could legislate individually. 14 Forced prostitution was defined in the 1910
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic as
"[t]he case of the retention, against her will, of a woman or girl in a house of
prostitution."15 This is essentially the commodification of repeated rape and
sexual slavery. The resemblance of the condition to slavery is emphasized by
the term "White Slave" in the title of the Convention. 16 This Comment
therefore uses the terms "forced prostitution," "commodified sexual slavery,"
and "commodified rape" interchangeably, though preferring as more accurate
the latter two terms over the former when not discussing treaties employing
the former term. This Comment explains that the relegation of commodified
sexual slavery to the "domestic" sphere created a liability rule exception to the
property rule governing human bodies that disproportionately affected women
9. 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001).
10. The waiver is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
11. Other cases hold that sovereign immunity is waived when the activity is one that can be
carried out by private entities in a commercial context. Given the existence of widespread and profitable
commercial prostitution rings, both historically and today, Japan's commodified prostitution centers,
even if they were illegal, meet the test for commercial waiver of sovereign immunity. See discussion
infra Part n.C.
12. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 340h, at 590-91 (1928) (citing
treaties prohibiting slavery).
13. A- Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution of the Prohibition
of Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary International Law, 39 VA. J. NT'L L. 303, 329 (1999)
("Since the early 1900s, sex trafficking and forced prostitution have been treated by the international
community as distinct from other forms of slavery and slave-like practices, even though they give rise to
similar effects (e.g., loss of human dignity).").
14. International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic at Final Protocol,
United Nations Sales No. 1950.IV.2 (1910) [hereinafter 1910 Convention] ("The case of the retention,
against her will, of a woman or girl in a house of prostitution could not, in spite of its gravity, be
included in the present Convention, because it is exclusively a question of internal legislation."). This
sentiment was not abrogated by treaty until the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S.
272, 282 (entered into force July 25, 1951). See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
15. 1910 Convention, supra note 14, Final Protocol.
16. The use of a human being's body against his or her will is a fundamental aspect of both
slavery and involuntary servitude. Compare Part IV, describing cases holding that forced prostitution
constitutes peonage and involuntary servitude. Moreover, sexual use of a human being against his or her
will constitutes the crime of rape.
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and girls. Couched in terms of Calabresi and Melamed's seminal formulation
of the property/liability rule framework, a liability rule provides that bodies
may be taken by force with compensation set ex post by the state. 17 In
contrast, a property rule bars taking without ex ante bargaining. 8 This
Comment also uses the term "de minimis liability rule" to signify the situation
wherein no bargaining leading to agreement occurs before a forcible taking of
an initial entitlement, and the compensation-if any-is set at a value so low
in comparison to the value of the resource as to effectively value the initial
entitlement at zero.
This Comment argues that the commercial activity reasoning in Hwang
Geum Joo v. Japan recharacterizes Japan's act of commodified mass rape as
an act that usurps the power of conquered states to set liability rules for
sexually enslaved bodies in their territory. Essentially, the idea of
commodified sexual slavery as an activity akin to commercial activities in
which private parties often engage vanished from the court's analysis. This
also explains the anomolous contrast between the Hwang Geum Joo court's
commercial activity ruling, and the D.C. Circuit's decision in Princz v.
Federal Republic of Germany'9 declining to rule that the leasing of Holocaust-
era Jewish slaves to industrial concerns by Germany was not a commercial
activity.20 Part II describes the events leading up to Hwang Geum Joo, and the
strong case for holding that commodified sexual slavery and rape constitute a
"commercial activity" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2) and
1603(d). This Part also argues that the district court's ruling raises the
question of whether U.S. courts may recognize, from the Hwang Geum Joo
court's extreme statist perspective, a purported sovereign prerogative to
sanction or induce forced prostitution. Part III describes the embodiment of
the notion of the sovereign prerogative to set liability and property rules for
victims of forced prostitution in pre-World War II-era treaties. Part IV
describes two prominent treaties in the post-World War II era that eliminate
the sovereign prerogative to set property and liability rules for women's
bodies, bringing about a convergence in an international property rule for all
human bodies. This Part argues that three sources of law render erroneous the
Hwang Geum Joo court's implicit recognition of the sovereign prerogative to
set liability rules for women and girls forced into prostitution: Japan's
ratification of treaties eliminating the sovereign prerogative to set property
17. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972); see also Jules Coleman & Jody
Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1336 (1986) ("Under a liability rule,
individuals who value entitlements more than those on whom the rights are initially conferred can secure
the entitlements without ex ante negotiations: they can compel transfers to themselves and pay
damages.").
18. Id. at 1092.
19. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
20. Id. at 1172 (noting that "the question is ... a close one, viz whether to pierce the
sovereign veil, lest the purpose of the statute be frustrated by the machinations of a rogue government
that in effect leases its immunity to a private party"). The Princz court based its dismissal on grounds the
Hwang Geum Joo court never reached, the failure to show the requirement of"direct effect in the United
States" in the third clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)'s waiver ofsovereign immunity. Id. at 1172-73.
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and liability rules for women's bodies; the United States' signing of the
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; and
the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Methodologically, this Comment aims to deliver an objective analysis,
aided by some terms associated with economic analysis. While this goal
diverges from the feminist belief in "permanent partiality, 21 this paper does
embrace the melding of techniques and readiness to recognize gendered
inequalities in purportedly neutral bodies of law that distinguish feminist
analyses. Though acknowledging that economic analysis is vulnerable to
many of the critiques employed by feminist authors towards international
law's institutions and elites,22 this Comment finds a male-shaped lense useful
to explain male-shaped international law and analysis. While law is not
neutral, objective or rational, the description and understanding of its impact
may be based on rational, objective inquiries and modes of analysis.
II. STATE-SPONSORED COMMODIFIED SEXUAL SLAVERY AND ITS
AFTERMATH: DOCTRINAL REVERSION
A. Commodified Sexual Slavery at the Point of a Sword
Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan3 has its origins in Imperial Japan's
perpetuation of a system of commodified rape centers to service its soldiers in
the World War II era. This system of forced prostitution was "unparalleled in
history" in terms of sheer systematic planning, conscription, and brutal
administration by a state,24 though "chilling parallels" exist to the rape centers
where thousands of Bosnian women suffered in the 1990s.2 5 More than
200,000 women were forced into commodified sexual slavery, 26 including
those trafficked from their nations to other occupied territories.27 The first
"comfort house," a misleading euphemism for a brutal pay-to-rape center, was
established in 1932.28 After the infamous "Rape of Nanjing" in 1937, where
21. HIlary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85 AM. J. INT'LL.
613, 613 (1991) (quoting S. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTIONINFEMINISM 194 (1986)).
22. Economic analysis is one of the archetypical disciplines adopting scientific rationality
towards the law, making it vulnerable to feminist critiques that it reproduces a masculine type of
reasoning. See id. at 615 (citing study by Carol Gilligan of male and female ways of thinking that
characterized the male mode of thinking "in abstract terms of right and wrong, fairness, logic,
rationality, winners and losers, ignoring context and relationships" and arguing that "[i]f legal reasoning
simply reproduces a masculine type of reasoning, its objectivity and authority are reduced"). Moreover,
the perpetuation of economic analysis and its continued practice was and is dominated by men. Cf. id. at
621-22 (critiquing international law's decision-makers and institutions as dominated by men).
23. 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001).
24. DAVID BOLING, MASS RAPE, ENFORCED PROSTUTrION, AND THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL
ARMY: JAPAN ESCHEwS LEGAL RESPONSIBIITY? 6 (3 Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in
Contemporary Asian Studies 1995). See also Update to the Final Report on Slavery, supra note 4, at 17
(terming Imperial Japan's comfort women system "[o]ne of the most egregious documented cases of
sexual slavery ... which in its totality constitutes crimes against humanity").
25. YOSHMII, supra note 2, at 19.
26. Update to the Final Report on Slavery, supra note 4, at 17.
27. See, e.g., JAPAN'S WAR RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 10 (describing orders for
trafficking of women and girls out of their home country to military zones).
28. Id. at2.
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Japanese soldiers mass raped, tortured and killed thousands of Chinese
women and men, the establishment of commodified rape facilities in Japan's
military theater accelerated.2 9
Japan gave several reasons for its use of the women: to prevent
espionage and the leak of military secrets feared to ensue from use of
uncontrolled private brothels; to provide "comfort" to Japanese soldiers given
virtually no leave; to prevent Japanese soldiers from raping women in
occupied territories; and to control outbreaks of venereal disease.30 The
commander of the Japanese Eleventh Army reported "almost all units are
accompanied by comfort women corps."31 To aid in its invasion of China,
which ultimately weakened the Nationalist government and helped boost
Communists into power, Imperial Japan by 1939 was importing as many as
one woman for every hundred soldiers into occupied areas.32 The races and
nationalities of the women ranged from Caucasian to East and South Asian,
including Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese, Chinese, Filipina, Indonesian,
Vietnamese, Indonesian, Dutch, Malaysian, Thai, Burmese, Indian, Eurasian,
and Australian.33
The women were referred to as "public toilets" and listed on military
supply lists as ammunition.34 Soldiers paid for each woman in a price scaled
according to purported ethnic inferiority,35 and waited their turn in line.36 The
army's accounting school taught how to allocate use of women in "comfort
stations" in a manner akin to planning efficient use of exhaustible resources.
In a 1930 interview, Shikanai Nobutaka, an army accounting officer described
his studies:
[W]e estimated the endurance of the women rounded up in local areas and the rates at
which they would wear out. We analyzed which women were strong or weak in those
areas, and then had to go so far as to determine "how long they would be in use" from the
time soldiers entered the rooms until they left-how many minutes for commissioned
officers, how many minutes for noncommissioned officers, how many minutes for
soldiers .... We set different prices for different ranks and prices for overstaying.Y
The Japanese army issued regulations concerning the percentage of fees that
the women could retain. 38 The amount women actually kept often was close to
zero because of purported cash advances for the costs of clothing, cosmetics,
medical treatment for illness or pregnancy, and pretextual forced savings or
contributions to "national defense."39
29. YosHMvi, supra note 2, at 49-51.
30. Id at 60, 72; JAPAN'S WAR REPONSBILITY, supra note 5, at 4-5.
31. YOSHMVl, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11 th Army in
1938).
32. Id. at 56 (quoting Matsumura Takeshi, chief of the Medical Section in the 21st Army).
33. JAPAN'S WAR RESPONsIBILITY, supra note 5, at 3.
34. BOLING, supra note 24, at 9.
35. JAPAN'S WAR RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 36.
36. See YOS-fVl!, supra note 2, at 130 for a photograph.
37. Id. at 61-6 (describing interview with Nobutaka).
38. Id. at 142.
39. Id. But see Report on the Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the
Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime, U.N. Commission on
[Vol. 27: 395
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As demand grew with the number of Japanese soldiers involved in
expanding invasions, "comfort women" were "recruited" through fraud, debt
bondage and brutal kidnappings often accompanied by murder, torture and
rape. Many girls were under the age of eighteen, as underage girls were
preferred because, among other things, they were unlikely to carry disease.40
In occupied villages, local leaders were forced to round up women and girls
and turn them over to the occupying Japanese.4 ' Some recruiters lured women
and girls with promises of jobs in war industries.42 Some of the recruitment
practices paralleled debt bondage. Women were told that their transportation
to the brothel and medical treatment were debts incurred, and that they could
not leave until all their debts were repaid through prostitution.
43
The events related by the plaintiffs in the Hwang Geum Joo complaint
illustrate the cruelties of the "recruitment" process. For example, plaintiff
Maxima Regala de la Cruz was abducted from her town in the Philippines
along with her mother, transported to a Japanese garrison, raped at saber point
by a Japanese soldier, and thereafter forced into commodified sexual slavery
along with her mother.44 A Japanese military officer abducted plaintiff Kim
Boon-Sun from her village in South Korea when she was fifteen years old,
and transported her on a ship with other young girls to Taiwan and later the
Philippines, where she was forced to provide sexual service to fifteen to
twenty soldiers a day, and sometimes more on weekends. 45 Plaintiff Zhu
Qiaomei was among seven women in her village who were forced to become
comfort women when her village fell to the Japanese. The women were forced
to report to work at a nearby comfort station or were raped in their homes by
Japanese soldiers. Plaintiff Zhu was raped throughout a pregnancy and after
giving birth.46 Ten-year old Narcisa Claveria was abducted by Japanese
soldiers to serve as a "comfort woman" after soldiers tortured her father to
death, raped her mother, and bayoneted her eight-year-old sister in front of
her.47
Comfort women who refused to serve soldiers often were beaten or
forced to submit at the point of a sword.48 The number of men each woman
served varied by location and time, but ranged from a few to seventy soldiers
a day.4 Military doctors examined the women for venereal diseases every
week to ten days, 50 but took "little notice of cigarette bums, bruises, bayonet
Human Rights, 52d Sess., at 10-11, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1996153/Add.1 (1996) [hereinafter Report on the
Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (reporting claims from a Japanese professor,
Ikuhito Hata, that comfort women made up to 110 times more income per month than the average
Japanese soldier).
40. JAPAN'S WAR REsPONsIBILrry, supra note 5, at 52.
41. Id. at 11.
42. Id. at 53.
43. Id. at38, 142.
44. Pl.'s Mot. for Declaratory I., supra note 1, at 11 (citing PUs Compl. 21).
45. Id. at 9 (citing PUs Compl. 11).
46. Id. at 10-11 (citing PUs Compl. 18).
47. Id. at 11 (citing PI.'s Compl. 20).
48. See, e.g., JAPAN'S WARREsPONsIBILITY, supra note 5, at 41.
49. Report on the Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, supra note 39, at 9.
50. JAPAN's WARRESPoNsIBILrrY, supra note 5, at 43.
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stabs and even broken bones" that were a consequence of the sexual
servitude.5' Some women stricken with disease were killed.52 A U.N. Special
Rapporteur reported that one Korean comfort women who contracted venereal
disease was "sterilized" by insertion of a hot iron bar into her vagina.
3
As a result of the brutality, women attempted suicide and escape.
5 4
Escape attempts, however, drew greater brutality, torture and murder, with
other comfort women forced to witness punishments. For example, one
Korean woman who asked why she and other women at her "comfort station"
were forced to serve as many as forty men a day was beaten with a sword,
stripped, tied, and then rolled over a board covered in nails until the nails were
red with her blood and torn flesh. She was then decapitated. One of the
Japanese officers told the women forced to watch that "it's easy to kill you all,
easier than killing dogs," and suggested that the dead girl's flesh be boiled and
the survivors forced to eat it.55 A new woman at the commodified rape center
who resisted by biting a soldier was decapitated and hacked into pieces while
other women were forced to watch. 6
When the Japanese surrendered in World War II, soldiers reportedly57
murdered many of the remaining comfort women. Less than 30 percent of
the women survived the war, according to estimates by some historians. 8 The
number of survivors is currently estimated as in the hundreds, compared to the
more than 200,000 estimated as forced into prostitution.59
B. Struggle for Justice Against a Political Tide
The crimes against the few survivors of the brutal sexual servitude
remain largely unremedied and unacknowledged.60 The only tribunal that
punished perpetrators of sexual slavery was a Dutch Military Tribunal in
Indonesia, which prosecuted Japanese soldiers for using thirty-five Dutch
women as sex slaves in the former Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia).6'
62Initially, Japan denied involvement. Japanese officials did not begin
acknowledging some involvement in operating "comfort stations" until
1992.63 In one of his last official acts, former Prime Minister Miyazawa
51. Report on the Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, supra note 39, at
10.
52. Id. at 15 (reporting testimony of survivor Hwang So Gyun).
53. Id. at 14 (reporting testimony of survivor Chong Ok Sun).
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 15 (citing testimony of survivor Hwang So Gyun).
57. Id. at 7. For example, in one case from Micronesia, the Japanese Army killed 70 women in
one night, "because they felt the women would be an encumbrance or an embarrassment were they to be
captured by the advancing American troops." Id.
58. BOLING, supra note 24, at 8.
59. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
60. Update to the Final Report on Slavery, supra note 4, at 17 ("The atrocities against the so-
called "comfort women" remain largely unremedied. There has been no reparation to the victims: no
official compensation, no official acknowledgment of legal liability, and no prosecutions.").
61. BOLING, supra note 24, at 13.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 56 (D.D.C. 2001).
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acknowledged that Imperial Japan condoned the brothels, but did not describe
the act as a war crime.64 Japan never paid reparations to the few surviving
comfort women,65 though in 1995 it did invite private citizens to contribute to
the Asian Women's Fund.6 Historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi reported that
"[m]any suspect that, in order to preserve its official position and avoid being
pressed by the UN Human Rights Commission, the government has come to
rely on this vague means of 'settling' the issue., 67 Japan continues to deny
legal responsibility, arguing that the women consented to being used and
therefore have no right to reparations under international law.68
Stonewalled in Japanese courts, which have echoed the Japanese
government's position that Japan bears neither legal responsibility nor moral
obligation to pay reparations, 69 the survivors' only vindication is a panel
initiated and convened by nongovernmental organizations, which delivered a
powerful statement that unfortunately had no legal force. The Women's
International War Crimes Tribunal deliberated over evidence brought by
prosecution teams from ten countries: North and South Korea, China, Japan,
the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia, East Timor, and the
Netherlands.7" Japan refused to enter an appearance. After four days of trial,
the tribunal, composed of a former president of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia from the United States, an international law scholar
from the United Kingdom, an Argentine criminal law judge, and a Kenyan
human rights lawyer, found Emperor Hirohito guilty on the basis of command
responsibility, and Japan guilty of violating customary international law and
its treaty obligations for slavery, forced labor, trafficking and rape amounting
to crimes against humanity. 71 Although this ruling has no legal force, it gives
a detailed analysis of the state responsibility of the government of Japan and
of the individual criminal culpability for those accused under law existing at
the time the crimes were committed. The forum also allowed an airing of the
64. BOLING, supra note 24, at 15.
65. HwangGeumJo0 , 172F. Supp. 2dat56.
66. Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comment, Women's International Tribunal on Japanese
Military Sexual Slavery, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 335 (2001).
67. YosImHD supra note 2, at 24.
68. Chinkin, supra note 66, at 335. Yoshimi observed that while the Japanese government
invited private citizens to donate to a private fund for victims of its state-sponsored prostitution, it has
been careful to avoid legal culpability:
[Tihe government has been able to maintain its position of not paying out even one yen in
reparations. This also leaves the government free to emphasize in private that while it
does have some 'moral responsibility' to former comfort women, the brunt of that
responsibility lies with private citizens. The government's acknowledgement of moral
responsibility is merely the flip side of its insistence that it has no legal responsibility.
YOSIIMI, supra note 2, at 24.
69. See YOsHMI, supra note 2, at 28-29 for a discussion of Japanese courts that have refused
to rule that Imperial Japan bears legal responsibility for state-sponsored forced prostitution, nor a
responsibility to offer reparations. One court did find legal responsibility to enact legislation to afford
compensation, but the decision was overturned by the Japanese High Court, which held that Japan is not
legally responsible to offer either an apology or monetary reparations. High Court Reverses Ruling
Favoring Comfort Women, DAILY YOMIui, Mar. 30, 2001, at 1.
70. Chinkin, supra note 66, at 336.
71. Id. at 338 (describing interim judgment).
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grave injustices experienced by the "comfort women." The failure of the
international community to secure these women a legal forum for evaluation
of this testimony and delivery of a ruling binding upon the government of
Japan represents a profound denial of justice continuing to the present day.
C. Turn to U.S. Court: Hwang Geum Joo and its Holding on the
Commercial Activity Waiver of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Fifteen survivors brought suit in a Washington, D.C. district court on
behalf of themselves and those similarly situated against the government of
Japan, only to hit another wall: dismissal of the complaint on grounds of
sovereign immunity and the political question doctrine.72 The plaintiffs
proposed three grounds for waiving sovereign immunity, and the court
rejected each one.73 This Comment is concerned with the Hwang Geum Joo
court's holding that commodified sexual slavery does not meet the test for the
commercial activity exception to the waiver of foreign sovereign immunity in
the third clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
The third clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) waives foreign sovereign
immunity for "an act [performed] outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere ... [that]
causes a direct effect in the United States." 74 The Hwang Geum Joo court
denied that the allegations of commodified sexual slavery by Imperial Japan
were "commercial," the threshold requirement for the waiver.75 The court thus
did not examine whether the facts alleged by the plaintiffs met the further
requirement for satisfying the commercial activity waiver to foreign sovereign
immunity of "direct effect in the United States." This Comment confines itself
to discussion of the Hwang Geum Joo court's analysis of the threshold
question, noting that the plaintiffs made a strong case that the second prong
also is satisfied. 76
72. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55 (D.D.C. 2001).
73. The court noted that the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994), supported a retroactive application of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, but like the Princz court, did not decide the issue, arguing that even
assuming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act governed, none of its exceptions applied. Hwang Geum
Joo, 172 F. Supp. 2d, at 57-58.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
75. Hwang Geum Joo, 172 F. Supp. 2d, at 63.
76. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act defines "United States" as including "all territory
and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). Plaintiffs argue that the establishment of comfort houses on the island of Guam
and the islands of the Philippines that became U.S. territories after the close of the Spanish-American
War in 1898 constituted direct effect in the United States. Moreover, they contend that Japan's surrender
of Korea south of the 38th north latitude and adjacent islands, the Philippines and other lands where
recruitment and commodified sexual slavery occurred to the United States further satisfies the "direct
effect" requirement. Pl.'s Mot. for Declaratory J., supra note 1, at 34-36. Because the District Court
neither addressed this question nor adduced enough facts for a circuit court to rule on the issue, this
question should be remanded for consideration. See Janini v. Kuwait University, 43 F.3d 1534, 1537
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding case back to district court to adduce further facts concerning whether
allegations met the "direct effect" requirement after reversing lower court's erroneous dismissal of the
case on the threshold question of whether the allegations constituted commercial activity).
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1. The Clear Case for a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for Commodified
Sexual Slavery
Court precedents and legislation concerning the proper inquiry for what
constitutes a commercial activity strongly support an argument that
commodified sexual slavery qualifies as a "commercial activity" under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). United States Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit
precedents firmly hold that the test for whether an alleged activity qualifies as
a "commercial activity" depends on whether the action is of the type in which
private parties engage in commerce.77 As expressly set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
1603(d), whether an activity qualifies as commercial "shall be determined by
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose." 78 Accordingly, court precedents
fimly establish that the motive of the state in engaging in the alleged activity
is irrelevant to the inquiry, as is the lack of profit-seeking motive or
consideration for the act.79 A now classic example of how a court disregards
motive in the inquiry of whether the alleged activity is one in which a private
actor may engage is the Supreme Court's hypothetical of a contract to buy
bullets or boots during a war. Because a private party may similarly buy goods
via contracts, the activity qualifies for a waiver, despite the sovereign
motivation of war-making.80 Another easy illustration of the correct inquiry is
the Ninth Circuit's holding that a cultural program sponsored by Taiwan to
foster closer relations with Chinese-Americans qualified for the commercial
activity exception, because the nature of the activity was similar to activities
by private, for-profit tour groups. 8' The complete lack of either profit motive
or actual profit, the fact that Taiwan actually spent its resources to fund the
activity rather than turned a profit, and the sovereign motive of fostering
closer ties were irrelevant.
8 2
77. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) ("[W]e conclude that when
a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it,
the foreign sovereign's actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of the FSIA."); accord Cicippio v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ('Putting aside for now the relationship
between purpose and context, we take from Weltover the key proposition that in determining whether a
given government activity is commercial under the act, we must ask whether the activity is one in which
commercial actors typically engage.").
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
79. The Supreme Court stated in Weltover that:
[B]ecause the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities] Act provides that the commercial
character of an act is to be determined by reference to its 'nature' rather than its
'purpose,' 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(d), the question is not whether the foreign government is
acting with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign
objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state
performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private
party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce.'
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (first emphasis added). Later in the decision the Court emphasized that
"[e]ngaging in a commercial act does not require the receipt of fair value, or even compliance with the
common-law requirements of consideration." Id. at 616 (1992).
80. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614-15; accord Cicippio, 30 F.3d at 166.
81. Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000) (O'Scannlain).
82. Id.
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According to this logic, trafficking in women for sexual purposes and
commodified sexual slavery clearly qualify for the commercial activity waiver
to foreign sovereign immunity, as akin to activities in which private actors
engage for profit. Sex trafficking and forced prostitution were lucrative trades
for private actors in the early 1900s, 83 including for many in Japan. Japan's
early private trade in commodified female flesh shows strong parallels with
the comfort women system that soon followed. Karayuki-san, the Japanese
term for prostitutes that worked abroad in the pre-World War II era,8
4
contained among their ranks children sold into sexual slavery by poor
families.85 Japanese men working abroad realized they could profit by
shipping Japanese women abroad to serve the colonizing Japanese elites,
creating an industry of about 20,000 women registered as overseas prostitutes
in 1910, according to government statistics. 86 In the early 1900s, the karayuki-
san "came to play an integral, if not clearly articulated, role in national
policies of expansion., 8 7 One Japanese government official even lauded their
contribution to the economy.88 The system was an outgrowth of a domestic
system of "officially condoned" prostitution and brothels opened by ronin,
masterless or unemployed samurai, that also marketed "girls and young
women sold into sexual servitude by parents desperate for cash," or tricked
into forced prostitution with the promise of a nonsexual job. 9 Concerned
about prestige costs, by 1920 the Japanese government ordered the
repatriation of all Japanese prostitutes. The key parallels between the private,
commercial karayuki-san and the comfort women system remain, however.
As one scholar noted: "Just as the karayuk-san formed the vanguard of
colonial and commercial expansion, 'military comfort women' (fugun ianfu)
were in the vanguard of Japanese military forces in Asia.... Eighty percent of
comfort women were between fourteen and eighteen years old, and the
83. U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON TRAFFIC IN PERSONS AND
PROSTITUTION at 4, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD.8 (1959) [hereinafter STUDY ON TRAFFIC IN PERSONS AND
PROSTITUTION]. The study quoted the 1927 findings of an investigation by the League of Nations'
Special Body of Experts relating to traffic in persons in twenty-six nations:
[R]eliable information has been obtained from certain countries which justifies the belief
that a traffic of considerable dimensions is being carried on. Many hundreds of young
women and girls-some of them very young-are transported each year from one
country to another for purposes of prostitution.
Id.
84. SHIMUZU HIROSHI & HIRAKAWA HITOSHI, JAPAN AND SINGAPORE IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 20 (1999).
85. See, e.g., Karen Colligan-Taylor, Translator's Preface and Acknowledgement to
YAMAZAI TOMOKO, SANDAKAN BROTHEL No. 8: AN EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF LOWER-CLASS
JAPANESE WOMEN, at ix (Karen Colligan-Taylor, trans., 1999) (describing the chronicle of a Japanese
woman born at the turn of the century and sold into prostitution in North Borneo).
86. Karen Colligan-Taylor, Translator's Introduction to YAMAZAKI TOMOKO, SANDAKAN
BROTHEL NO. 8: AN EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF LOWER-CLASS JAPANESE WOMEN, at xvii (Karen
Colligan-Taylor, trans., 1999).
87. Id. at xxii.
88. Id.
89. Id. at xvi, xxi.
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majority were deceived or kidnapped in the same manner as were young
Japanese women who became karayuki-san in earlier decades. '" 90
Commodified sexual slavery was also recognized as a problematic
commercial activity in the United States by the early 1900s. As early as 1909,
Americans expressed consternation over the practice of "white slavery." The
term was used at the time to signify "the forced prostitution of white women
and girls by trick, narcotics, and coercion,"91 essentially commodified sexual
servitude and rape by private parties.
Commodified sexual slavery today has exploded national boundaries
and control, facilitated by modem means of advertising and transportation that
enable the phenomenon of the sex tour package.92 Many of those forced into
prostitution are children, like many of the comfort women at the time of their
first rape. A 1996 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Sale of Children and Child Pornography estimated that about one million
children in Asia alone are forced into the sex industry, and that the child
prostitution industry in 1995 generated about $5 billion globally.93
Contemporary methods of recruitment into forced sexual slavery echo some of
those used by Japan in the past, including debt bondage, fraudulent promises
of wage labor in non-sex industries, and sale of women and children.94 Brutal
methods of torture, murder and rape used to retain women95 also echo the
practices used by Imperial Japan not so long ago. Japanese men are among the
patrons of today's sex industry, prompting scholar Suzuki Yoko to suggest
that "the modem sex industry, whether it involves the consumption of Asian
women by Japanese men at home or abroad, is a contemporary version of the
Japanese Imperial Army's exploitation of Asian women as comfort women,"
with the only difference being that "the men now wear business suits rather
than military uniforms."
96
The commodification of women in Imperial Japan's system of forced
sexual slavery is akin to the commodification performed by private profiteers.
As discussed in Part II.A, supra, the clientele of the system, Japanese soldiers,
paid to rape the "comfort women" held in commodified sexual slavery.
Japanese military accounting offices learned how to price and set periods of
use for human commodities.97 "Comfort stations" were "regarded as merely
another amenity" 98-the convenient location of women, the rape of whom
was available for purchase by soldiers in the military theater.
90. Id. at xxv.
91. FREDERICK K GRInTNER, WHIrE SLAVERY: MYTH, IDEOLOGY, AND AmERIcAN LAW 3
(1990).
92. See JEREMY SEABROOK, No HIDING PLACE: CHILD SEX TouRisM AND THE ROLE OF
EXTRATERRTORIAL LEGISLATION 121-22 (2000) (explaining that Internet advertising and the increase in
cheaper intercontinental air travel facilitate child sex tourism).
93. See id. at 121 (citing figures from a 1996 United Nations Commission on Human Rights
report).
94. Rassam, supra note 13, at 322-24.
95. Id.
96. Colligan-Taylor, supra note 86, at xxvi-xxvii (paraphrasing Yoko's reasoning).
97. See id. at 61-62; see also text accompanying supra note 37.
98. Report on the Mission to the Democratic Republic ofKorea, supra note 39, at 6.
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The D.C. Circuit has stated in a majority opinion by Judge Silberman
that the illegal character of an act is probabl not a bar to sovereign immunity,
despite contrary rulings from other circuits. 99 The court gave two grounds for
this assertion. First, "all causes of action can be thought, in some sense, to
accuse a defendant of acting unlawfully." 100 Second, and more importantly,
the court observed that the Supreme Court, in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, had
eschewed the reasoning of past courts that illegal activities are not commercial
per se, though the approach "offered the most obvious line of analysis."10'
The issue of the legality of the allegations was not significant to the Hwang
Geum Joo court's rejection of the commercial activity waiver of foreign
sovereign immunity. Because this Comment's concern is with a historical
inequity in international law reflected in the logic of the district court's
commercial activity reasoning, this Comment accepts Judge Silberman's
reasoning and does not argue the issue further, except to note that many of the
most profitable commercial activities for private actors are illegal.
2. The Hwang Geum Joo Court's Converse Commercial Activity
Holding
The Hwang Geum Joo court dismissed the suit on summary judgment,
however, with only a fleeting mention of the commodification of forced
rape,10 2 and no recognition of the troubling parallels between Imperial Japan's
system of forced sexual slavery and the trafficking of women in the private
sector. Rather, the Hwang Geum Joo court held that since Japan (1) used
resources like transportation, construction crews and material, (2) to further a
system established for the benefit of soldiers, and (3) abducted women from
occupied countries, the allegations amounted to an abuse of military power or
a potential "war crime" or "crime against humanity," but "not in connection
with a commercial activity.',10 3 Which of the factors persuaded the court is
unclear in the court's ultimately cryptic reasoning that "[a]s plaintiffs
correctly recognize, this system 'required' the resources at the government's
disposal. Such conduct is not typically engaged in by private players in the
market."' 04 The observation that in their massive scale and impact, the
activities could constitute a "war crime" or "crime against humanity" certainly
is no bar to the application of the commercial activity waiver, if, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d), the nature of the course of conduct-commodification of
99. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reasoning that the
Supreme Court, in its analysis in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993), did not hold that the
illegality of wrongful imprisonment and torture prevented them from being proper subjects for the
application of the commercial activity exception, but rather that the exercise of police power is a
sovereign prerogative).
100. Id. at 167.
101. Id.
102. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64 (D.D.C. 2001) ("The mere fact that
soldiers allegedly paid money in order to access 'comfort stations' is insufficient to justify
characterizing the challenged conduct as commercial in nature.").
103. Id. at 63-64.
104. Id.
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sexual slavery-is one in which private actors engage. For example, in Princz
v. Federal Republic of Germany,' the D.C. Circuit refrained from ruling that
the leasing of Holocaust-era Jewish slaves to industrial concerns by Germany
was not a commercial activity, noting that "the question is ... a close one, viz.
whether to pierce the sovereign veil, lest the purpose of the statute be
frustrated by the machinations of a rogue government that in effect leases its
immunity to a private party.
10 6
Nor is the grand scale of the activity, when fueled by the sovereign
power of the state, sufficient grounds for refusing to apply the commercial
activity waiver of foreign sovereign immunity. The large scale is due to the
state marshaling its competitive advantages in contracting. The framers of the
1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act recognized that states increasingly
are entering the marketplace and competing with private market players, and
codified the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, under which
foreign states are not immune for suits based on their commercial or private
acts. 0 7 The 1976 Act was aimed at equalizing the market playing field in at
least one regard-liability for torts. Imposing a size-of-the-enterprise inquiry
also creates perverse incentives. The more egregious the state's abuse of its
competitive power, the greater the probability for commission of a tort based
on expanded activities. In the case of an activity with high external costs, the
greater the number of injured people, the more the state would be shielded
from the reach of the law.
The remaining possible rationales for holding that commodified sexual
slavery by Imperial Japan did not constitute a commercial activity are even
weaker. If the court was swayed by the fact that the system of commodified
sexual slavery was for the benefit of Japanese soldiers, the holding seems
contrary to legislation and precedent mandating that the motive of the
sovereign is irrelevant to the commercial activity inquiry. If the court was
persuaded by the enumeration of inputs by Imperial Japan into the comfort
women system-for example, construction crews and materials-the
reasoning suggests an internally flawed inquiry into the source of Imperial
Japan's power to carry out its system of commodified sexual slavery. All acts
105. 26F.3d 1166 (1994).
106. Id. at 1172. The Princz court based its dismissal on grounds the Hwang Geum Joo court
never reached, the failure to show the requirement of "direct effect in the United States" in the third
clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)'s waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1172-73. The Hwang Geum Joo
plaintiffs made convincing arguments that the direct effect requirement was satisfied. These arguments
are described in supra note 76.
107. This is clear from the legislative history:
At the hearings on the bill it was pointed out that American citizens are increasingly
coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by foreign states.... In a
modem world where foreign state enterprises are every day participants in commercial
activities, H.K 11315 is urgently needed legislation. The bill... would... codify the so-
called "restrictive" principle of sovereign immunity, as presently recognized in
international law. Under this principle, the immunity of a foreign state is 'restricted' to
suits involving a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to suits
based on its commercial or private acts (jure gestionis).
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, RR REP. No. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
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performed by a state, whether contracting to buy bullets, or deciding to default
on payments, occur under government authority and power. Under the source
of power inquiry, then, no act of state would qualify for the commercial
activity waiver to foreign sovereign immunity, though the activity itself may
be one a private individual may perform. The reasoning also finds no support,
despite repeated references by the Hwang Geum Joo court, in the Supreme
Court holding in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson'1° that allegations of wrongful police
detention and arrest failed to qualify as "commercial activities" because
exercise of police power to detain and arrest are uniquely sovereign functions.
The Nelson court adhered to the private actor test for commercial activity,
reasoning "the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state
performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which
a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce."" 09 No private actor
engages in arrest and detention of suspected dissidents or malfeasors in prison
for profit. In contrast, as discussed in Part II.C.1, supra, many private actors
engage in commodified sexual slavery for profit. The proper inquiry is into
the "nature of the course of conduct"" 0 alleged, not the source of sovereign
power or motivation behind the activity.
D. Hwang Geum Joo Rephrased: Reversion to the Purported Sovereign
Prerogative to Set Liability Rules for Women's Bodies
The District Court's ruling may be predicated on reasoning that is less
obvious-and less obviously contrary to precedent. The court may have
performed the inquiry into the nature of the activity alleged from the
perspective of the state, rather than the individuals affected, fading the
commodification of sexual slavery from the primary field of vision. At the
individual level, the harm was commodified sexual slavery and rape, and the
benefit to Japanese soldiers was the use of women's bodies for pay. From the
perspective of states, however, the wrong may be viewed as Imperial Japan
usurping the uniquely sovereign activity of setting property and liability rules
for women's bodies from the states that it conquered, a war crime now
prohibited by the Geneva Convention."' That is, the harm may be re-
characterized as the usurpation of the right to determine whether the bodily
integrity of women within the jurisdiction may be disrupted by commodified
sexual slavery and rape without ex ante bargaining, setting a de minimis
liability rule that has the effect of regularizing and facilitating an activity that
brutalizes women's bodies.
108. 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
109. Id. at 360-61.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (defining "commercial activity").
111. See YOUGINDRA KHUSHALANI, DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF WOMEN AS BASIc AND
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (1982) (describing art. 27(2) of the Geneva Convention of 1949
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, as prohibiting rape and enforced prostitution "in all places and in all circumstances").
Under the Geneva Convention, "women[,] whatever their nationality, race, religious beliefs, age, marital
status or social condition[,] have an absolute right to respect for their honour and their modesty; in short,
for their dignity as women." Id.
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In their seminal formulation, Calabresi and Melamed described a
property rule as one that forbid the taking of a resource without ex ante
bargaining that leads to consent:
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to
remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller ... It lets each of the
parties say how much the entitlement is worth to him, and gives the seller a veto if the
buyer does not offer enough. Property rules involve a collective decision as to who is to
be given an initial entitlement but not as to the value of the entitlement.'"
2
A liability rule permits someone to:
destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for
it.... This value may be what it is thought the original holder of the entitlement would
have sold it for. But the holder's complaint that he would have demanded more will not
avail him once the objectively determined value is set.
13
This Comment uses the term de minimis liability rule to describe an extreme
version of a liability rule, in which the state sets no ex post penalty for a
destruction of an entitlement, effectively setting the value of the entitlement at
zero.
In the context of prohibitions against the use of women's bodies as a
depersonalized commodity, a property rule would forbid forced prostitution,
which fails to allow for ex ante bargaining, but allow consensual prostitution,
assuming that despite socioeconomic coercion, such a thing is possible. A
liability rule would allow forced prostitution with expost compensation, as set
by the state, while a de minimis liability rule would permit forced prostitution
with no compensation, setting the victim's entitlement to bodily integrity at
zero.
The usurpation of the conquered state's power over its women is a
repossession of the women by the conquering state and disruption of the initial
allocation of property entitlements in her bodily integrity possessed by her
society, husband and family relations, as set by the defeated state. These
property entitlements in the woman had the derivative effect of property
protections for the woman, rendering her body inviolate without ex ante
bargaining. Note that under the sovereign prerogative to set liability rules for
women's bodies, the conquered state was free to tolerate a liability rule for
women who fell out of the regime of property entitlements in the woman's
sexuality, i.e., by seduction or rape and continued rape during forced
prostitution.
Under military conquest, women in conquered states were no longer
protected even by kinship or marital ties; they could be seduced, raped, or
subjected to continued rape during forced prostitution. The previously existing
regime of property entitlements in the woman's sexuality could be ignored by
the conquering Imperial battalions. The benefit to Japan was the conversion
112. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1092.
113. Id.
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and exercise of this seized prerogative, without the constraints of recognizing
initial allocation of property entitlements in the women and the vestigial
property protections vested by the defeated states. Arguably this seizure of
sovereign prerogative constitutes the kind of dealings between states that the
D.C. Circuit has held is a uniquely sovereign activity protected by sovereig
immunity.1 4 In light of the persistence of the sex industry discussed above,
n
5
however, this statist perspective seems strained. In describing the creation of
"comfort stations" as an abuse of power made possible by military conquest
and might, the court essentially opted not to see the effect of the activity
alleged on its human victims, and its parallels to commodified rape by private
actors.
This interpretation of Hwang Geum Joo raises the complicated question
of whether courts should recognize a sovereign prerogative to set property and
liability rules for women's bodies. If no such prerogative exists, no
interchange of prerogatives between sovereigns occurred, and the court must
view the acts alleged in Hwang Geum Joo for what they are-commodified
mass rapes that qualify for the waiver of foreign sovereign immunity under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), as discussed in Part II.C.1, supra. Arguably this
determination may depend upon understanding the way that forced
prostitution has been treated under international law, both today and during
World War II. The sections that follow argue that, although at one time a
sovereign prerogative to set liability rules for use of women's bodies may
have existed under international law, today international law, as recognized by
Japan, outlaws forced prostitution.
III. THE ERA OF THE STATE PREROGATIVE TO SET INITIAL PROPERTY AND
LIABILITY RULES FOR VICTIMS OF COMMODIFIED SEXUAL SLAVERY
Historically, treaties distinguished between sex trafficking, forced
prostitution, and slavery, creating a hierarchy of protections for enslaved
human beings. The definition of "slavery" that was the subject of early treaties
emerged from the experience of the Atlantic slave trade, which trafficked in
African human beings.1 16 While Atlantic slavery did result in many rapes and
sexual abuses of women, 117 sex trafficking and forced prostitution "[s]ince the
early 1900s .. . have been treated by the international community as distinct
114. Cf. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("When two
governments deal directly with each other as governments, even when the subject matter may relate to
the commercial activities of its citizens or governmental entities, or even the commercial activity
conducted by government subsidiaries, those dealings are not akin to that of participants in a
marketplace."). The Hwang Geum Joo court considered Cicippio in its commercial activity discussion,
Hwang Geum Joo, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63, 64, though it did not explicitly cite this passage from
Cicippio.
115. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
116. See Rassam, supra note 13, at 329 ("[T]he nineteenth-century customary international law
-.. arose in specific response to the Atlantic chattel slave trade.").
117. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Note, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment
Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 796-803 (1993) (describing sexual abuses of
antebellum slaves, and "fancy-girl markets," where the sexuality of certain women and girl slaves was
commodified to command a higher price).
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from other forms of slavery and slave-like practices, even though they give
rise to similar effects."'118
Slavery was defined in Article 1 of the 1926 Convention to Suppress the
Slave Trade and Slavery 19 as "the status or condition of a person over whom
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised," a
definition at once narrow, because all rights of ownership must be exercised,
and open-textured, because it was unclear what "all rights" signified.120 Usage
in treaty law, however, clearly distingished sex trafficking from forced
prostitution by the term "white slavery," though not all women so used were
Caucasian. The term suggested a racial valuation for flesh commodities that
were the object of sexual desire, reflecting social mores regarding which races
were appropriate objects for sexual coupling. Sex trafficking and forced
prostitution were the subjects of separate treaties 121 and international
proscription evolved more slowly than prohibition of Atlantic slavery, a
phenomenon that disproportionately impacted women and girls.
Yet forced prostitution shares the most fundamental characteristic of
slavery-use of a human's body against his or her will, with the additional
indignity of the commodification of this use-as implicitly acknowledged
even in differential treaties by the term "white slavery." Forced prostitution,
as sexual use of a human against his or her will, also constitutes rape, leading
this Comment to use the term "forced prostitution" interchangeably with
"commodified sexual slavery" and "commodified rape," though preferring the
latter two terms as more accurate when not discussing treaty provisions.
Because of the commonality, it is no surprise that both sexual slavery and
Atlantic slavery faced the same conceptual roadblocks to proscription, albeit
in different eras. International law asserts a private/public distinction
regarding proper objects of international legislation and control, a distinction
that often has operated to exclude problems that women face at the hands of
nominally private actors abetted by the neglect of state actors. 22 International
law imposes artificial conceptual distinctions between "matters of 'public'
concern, and matters ,rivate' to states that are considered within their
domestic jurisdiction."'
Still, Atlantic slavery was considered a sufficient affront to natural law
conceptions that by 1928 it was considered a violation of the "Law of
Nations," defined then as "a product of Christian civilization and
represent[ing] a legal order which binds States, chiefly Christian, into a
community. ' 124 International scholar Bonfils argued that international law
condemned slavery, reasoning that slaves became free when they set foot in a
118. Rassam, supra note 13, at 337.
119. Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 255 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery
Convention].
120. See id. art. 1 (defining slavery).
121. Rassan, supra note 13, at 337.
122. Charlesworth et al., supra note 21, at 625.
123. Id.
124. OPPEEIM, supra note 12, § 292, at 523.
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country that rejected slavery. 125 Treatise writer Oppenheim disagreed with
Bonfils, stating famously, "[ilt is difficult to say that customary International
Law condemns two of the greatest curses which man has ever imposed upon
his fellow-man, the institution of slavery and the traffic in slaves."'126 He noted
that multilateral and bilateral efforts at stamping out slavery were not
sufficient to make the traffic in slaves a crime jure gentium, which would be
repressible by any state regardless of the nationality of the offender.
127
Several multilateral and bilateral treaties were in place by 1926,
however, that outlawed slavery. The Treaty of Paris of 1814 between Great
Britain and France represented one of the earliest bilateral efforts. 28 Among
the most widely subscribed treaties was the Convention of St. Germain of
September 10, 1919, which "endeavored to secure the complete suppression
of slavery and of the slave trade by land and by sea." 9 By 1926, the
Convention was signed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire,
France, Italy, Japan, and Portugal, and accepted in advance by Germany,
Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary in the Treaties of Peace.130 Most significantly,
the Slavery Convention of 1926,' with nineteen signatories by 1928,3
bound parties:
(a) To prevent and suppress the slave trade;
(b) To bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of
slavery in all its forms. 1
33
In contrast to the prohibitions on slavery, forced prostitution was
submerged as a private issue of domestic jurisdiction until 1949. Early
conventions focused on the recruitment, or corruption of women, and ceased
their reach when the women were successfully forced into prostitution,
becoming besmirched beyond the reach of international law.' 34 Parties to the
1904 International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic 3 5 agreed to set up watch at points of departure to gather data on
women and girls being trafficked abroad for "immoral purposes.' ' 136 Parties to
the 1910 International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave
125. Id. §340hat590n.l.
126. Id. § 340h, at 590.
127. Id. Compare the later naming of the eradication of slavery as an example of a legal
obligation erga omnes, referring to legal rights that are "the concern of all states," and so important that
"all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection." Barcelona Traction, Light & Power
Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (second phase) (judgment of Feb. 5).
128. OPPENHEnM, supra note 12, § 340h, at 590.
129. Id. at 591.
130. Id. at 591 n.2.
131. 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 119.
132. OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, § 340h n.3, at 590.
133. 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 131, art. 2.
134. NOTRAF, Background Study on Basic Principles for a Code of Conduct Within Member
States of the European Union to Prevent and Combat Traffic in Women, Pt. I, Nov. 1996, available at
ftp://lists.inet.co.thlpub/sea-aids/gend/gend45.txt (report arising from the European Conference on
Trafficking in Women).
135. International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, U.N. Sales No.
1950.IV.1 (1904) [hereinafter 1904 Agreement on White Slave Traffic].
136. Id. art. 2.
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Traffic pledged to punish one who, "to gratify the passions of others, has by
fraud or by the use of violence, threats, abuse of authority, or any other means
of constraint, hired, abducted or enticed a woman or girl of full age for
immoral purposes.' 37 Those who "hired, abducted or enticed" minors for
"immoral purposes" would be punished regardless of consent.138 A minor was
one under twenty years of age. 139 The Final Protocol to the 1910 Convention
expressly stated that "[t]he case of the retention, against her will, of a woman
or girl in a house of prostitution could not, in spite of its gravity, be included
in the present Convention, because it is exclusively a question of internal
legislation.' 140 A 1921 Agreement under the auspices of the League of
Nations extended the protections of the 1904 and 1910 Conventions to minors
of either sex, and raised the age of protection for minors to twenty-one. 141 The
1933 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of
Full Age punished the "procuring, enticing or leading away, even with her
consent, a woman or girl of full age, for immoral purposes to be carried out in
another country."'
142
Each of these treaties protected the initial allocation of property interests
in women accorded by the sovereign state to its citizens, refraining from
interference in domestic decisions concerning the allocation of liability and
property rules for different classes of women. The concern animating the pre-
World War II treaties was against disruption of the initial allocation of
property rights in women. Norma Deitleiner has noted the implicit distinction
between "women who have not yet fallen prey to 'the procuration.., with a
view to their debauchery in a foreign country' and therefore must be protected
from being approached, and those foreign women 'who surrender themselves
to prostitution' and will eventually be repatriated."'143 The repatriation
provisions of the 1904 Convention illustrate that the motivation behind this
distinction is restoration of the initial state allocation of property rights in
women. Article 3 of the Convention provides "[t]he Governments also
undertake, within legal limits, and as far as possible, to send back to their
country of origin those women and girls who desire it, or who may be claimed
by persons exercising authority over them."'144 Article 4 of the Convention
elaborates on the theme in Article 3 of restoring property interests in the
woman to "persons exercising authority over them":
Where the woman or girl to be repatriated cannot herself repay the cost of transfer, and
has neither husband, relations, nor guardian to pay for her, the cost of repatriation shall be
137. 1910 Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
138. Id. art.1.
139. STUDY ON TRAFFiC INPERSONS ANDPROSTITUTION, supra note 83, at 1.
140. 1910 Convention on White Slave Traffic, supra note 14, Final Protocol.
141. STUDY ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND PROSTrImON, supra note 83, at I (citing
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, Sept. 30, 1921, 9
L.N.T.S. 416, 116 B.F.S.P. 547.).
142. Id. (citing International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full
Age, Oct. 11, 1933, 150 L.N.T.S. 431).
143. Nora V. Demleitner, Forced Prostitution: Naming an Interndtional Offense, 18 FORDHAM
INT'LL.J. 163, 167 (1994) (citing 1904 Agreement on White Slave Traffic, supra note 135, arts. 1, 3).
144. 1904 Agreement on White Slave Traffic, supra note 135.
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borne by the country where she is in residence as far as the nearest frontier or port of
embarkation in the direction of the country of origin; and by the country of origin as
regards the rest.'
45
The preoccupation of these provisions is restoring initial property entitlements
in the woman allocated by the sovereign state to her husband, relations or
guardians-and failing that, the state, who owns her in the sense that it can set
property or liability rules regarding her person.
Scholars that co-authored a report for the Center for Research and
Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility argue that Imperial Japan
primarily used women taken from occupied territories in their "comfort
stations" in part because the nation was a signatory of the 1910 Convention
and thus legally prohibited from trafficking in Japanese women and children
for the purposes of prostitution, though not against trafficking women and
children in colonies.146 In essence, Imperial Japan bound itself to recognize
initial entitlements in its citizens, but was free to disrupt entitlements set by
states it invaded and occupied.
The 1910 Convention expressly relegates forced prostitution-the actual
act of sexual enslavement, rather than the disruption of initial, domestically
determined distinctions between pure and debauched woman-to domestic
law. Expressed alternatively, it is the state's prerogative to determine whether
the woman shall be protected by an inalienability rule, property rule, or
liability rule. In contrast, when states forbade slavery by treaties in the early
1900s, they were binding themselves to a multilateral property norm for
human bodies and their labor. Bodies could not be possessed, and labor forced
without bargaining ex ante as to a price. States acknowledged that the natural
law prohibition against slavery rendered the matter a proper subject of
multilateral bargaining and agreements that would accrete to become
customary international law and obligations erga omnes.147 States were
acknowledging, in the terminology prevalent in 1928, that slavery was an
affront to the Law of Nations, such that the prerogative of individual states to
permit it properly could be curtailed. The relegation of forced prostitution to
the private sphere, as a domestic matter improper for multilateral prohibition
thus created an exception to the multilateral property rule norm for human
bodies that developed as a response to Atlantic slavery. This exception
disproportionately affected female bodies.
Under this exception, the setting of property or liability rules for female
bodies was a prerogative of the state. Forced prostitution without ex ante
compensation and consent but with state-set ex post compensation created a
liability rule for female bodies. As was often the case, forced prostitution
without even ex post compensation created de facto zero-liability rules. In
effect, once besmirched, these women and girls were accorded less
consideration than natural law demanded for human beings generally,
145. Id.
146. JAPAN's WAR REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 5-6.
147. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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emphasizing that the personhood and humanity of women and girls were
recognized only insofar as they fit neatly in the initial allocation of property
rights in her to her family, husband, relations and state. When kidnapped,
stripped and raped repeatedly in forced prostitution, the woman or girl also
was stripped of her personhood and natural law rights.
IV. CONVERGENCE: THE DELETION OF THE LIABILITY RULE EXCEPTION
Two treaties in the post-World War II era disrupted the troubling
historical period of disparate, gendered norms regarding sexual enslavement.
Both the 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others148 and the 1979 UN Convention
on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women149 outlaw
forced prostitution. Japan ratified both treaties, 150 and its ratification acts as
estoppel against asserting or benefiting from a purported sovereign
prerogative to set liability rules for women's bodies. Moreover, the signing by
the United States of the 1979 Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against
Women, even without ratification, should guide U.S. courts towards
interpretations of law that avoid direct conflict with the Convention's
obligations if clear and compelling alternatives are available. Finally, the
Thirteenth Amendment sets property protection for all human bodies, thus
barring U.S. courts from recognizing any purported sovereign prerogative to
set liability rules for a particular set of bodies, though this constitutional
question need not be reached because the prior arguments are dispositive.
The Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others pierced the domestic domain rule
that submerged the problem of forced prostitution below the reach of
multilateral agreement. The Preamble of the Convention speaks in natural law
terms of the "dignity and worth of the human person," signaling a shift in the
approach of conventions on sexual servitude. Article 1 of the Convention
binds parties to
[P]unish any person who to gratify the passions of another: 1. Procures, entices or leads
away, for purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the consent of that person;
2. Exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the consent of that person.'
148. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 272 (opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, entered into
force July 25, 195 1) [hereinafter 1949 Convention].
149. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, art. 6, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 16 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women].
150. Ratification information for the 1979 Convention is available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/bibleenglishinternetbiblepart/chapterIV/treaty9.asp. Ratification information for the 1949
Convention is available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterVII
treatyl l.asp.
151. 1949 Convention, supra note 148, pmbl.
152. Id. art. 1.
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The Convention thus covers the subject of forced prostitution both prior to
being debauched, and after debauchment, removing the distinction between
the pure woman and girl worthy of protection and the fallen female of past
Conventions. The 1949 Convention is solicitous of aiding those engaged in
prostitution, removing domestic laws or regulations that subject prostitutes to
special registration requirements, 153 and providing for the undertaking or
encouragement of "public and private educational, health, social, economic
and other related services, measures for the prevention of prostitution and for
the rehabilitation and social adjustment of the victims of prostitution and of
the offences referred to in the present Convention." 154 The Convention thus
recognizes the dignity of the individual forced into prostitution, and does not
discard her once debauched, but envisions "rehabilitation." Thus, under the
Convention, the intrinsic worth of the female person does not depend on her
sexual state.
The piercing of the domestic-issue veil accomplished by the 1949
Convention lead many states to resist ratification and accession. As a result, in
1999, the Convention was ratified by only 66 of the 160 United Nations
member states. 155 States that refused to sign the Convention cited
constitutional incompatibility and disagreement with the basic assumptions of
the text.156 Many states refused to accede because prostitution within their
borders was highly regulated.
157
The Convention also drew criticism for ambiguity as to whether it
intends to abolish only forced prostitution or all forms of prostitution. 158 On
its face, the Preamble to the Convention declares "prostitution and the
accompanying evil of the traffic in persons for the purpose of prostitution are
incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person." Unclear in this
definition is whether the prohibition against "exploitation of prostitution" in
Article 1 includes more than forced prostitution on its terms. The term
"exploitation of prostitution" is not defined. A later U.N. report, however,
asserts that "[l]egal provisions proscribing prostitution should not therefore be
considered as prerequisite measures to be taken in conjunction with the
abolition of the regulation of prostitution," since prohibition of prostitution
may drive prostitution underground, and be enforced selectively against
prostitutes.
Japan signed, ratified and acceded to the 1949 Convention, accepting the
Convention's elimination of forced prostitution, a category of "exploitation of
prostitution," as a subject of domestic legislation improper for multilateral
agreements. Japan also assumed treaty obligations that bound states to accord
153. Id. art. 6.
154. Id. art. 16.
155. MARjAN WIJERS & LIN LAP-CHEw, TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, FORCED LABOUR AND
SLAVERY-LIKE PRACTICES IN MARRIAGE, DoMEsTIC LABOUR AND PROSTITUTION 26 (1999).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Janie Chuang, Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women: Definitions, Paradigms,
and Contexts, II HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 76 (1998).
159. STUDY ON TRAFFIC IN PERSONS AND PROsTITUTION, supra note 83, at 11.
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women property protections against forced prostitution, calling for
"punishment" of those who transgress these property protections. A de
minimis liability rule for female bodies is clearly forbidden by the 1949
Convention-a state is obliged to levy a sanction. Importantly, the form of
sanction states are obliged to levy is more than a mere state-set indemnity, or,
in the words of Calabresi and Melamed, the setting of "a value determined by
some organ of the state rather than by the parties themselves." 160 The state's
obligation to punish signifies criminal prosecution by the state, the
punishment accorded to transgressors of property norms. "Punishment" is
accorded to those who upset an initial allocation of entitlements. Japan's
accession to the 1949 Convention estops it from asserting a sovereign
prerogative to set liability rules for the bodies of those forced into prostitution.
The widely ratified 1979 U.N. Convention on Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women161 reiterates the contemporary international
property rule applying to the bodies of those forced into prostitution. To
further the broad nondiscrimination objective of the Convention, Article 6
requires all States to "take all appropriate measures ... to suppress all forms
of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women." 162 While
"exploitation of prostitution" is undefined in the 1979 Convention, similar to
the 1949 Convention, the state commitment to "suppress" exploitation of
prostitution eliminates the right of signatories to tolerate or establish liability
rules for the bodies of those forced into prostitution. Japan is a signatory of
the Convention, and thus is doubly estopped from asserting any sovereign
prerogative to set liability rules for women's bodies.
The United States also is a signatory of the Convention, though the
Senate has failed to ratify the treaty due to concerns over potential assumption
of certain obligations, for example those related to women in the military. 63
As a signatory, and the only Western democracy that has failed to ratify the
Convention, it has been said that the United States will "undoubtedly" ratify
the Convention. AccordinF to Malvina Halberstam, It]he question is when
and with what limitations."16 Thus, as a prudential matter, U.S. courts should
avoid interpretations that may be contrary to the Convention and not the
subject of proposed U.S. reservations to the Convention if another course of
reasoning is possible. None of the proposed reservations considered thus far
by the United States would claim a sovereign right to tolerate forced
prostitution, nor could the United States assert such a right within the
constraints of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
66
160. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1092.
161. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 149.
162. Id.
163. Malvina Halberstam, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, in WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 145-52 (Kelly
D. Askin and Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000).
164. Id. at 162.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 145-52 (discussing proposed reservations to the Convention that do not include
any right of the United States to tolerate forced prostitution).
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The abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids U.S. courts from recognizing a
claim of a sovereign prerogative to allow forced prostitution. Courts have
ruled that forced prostitution violates the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude.167 A strong argument may be made that forced
prostitution falls under the purview of the Thirteenth Amendment's
proscription of slavery, whether performed by public or private actors,
because the "'customary ravishment and prostitution of colored women"' was
considered one of the ills of slavery at the time of the Thirteenth
Amendment's enactment; sexual slavery constituted a ubiquitous component
of the slave trade; forced prostitution today parallels antebellum slavery; and
forced prostitution fits tests courts today use when applying the Thirteenth
Amendment's proscription against slavery in non-antebellum contexts.
168
The Thirteenth Amendment thus constitutes separate and independent
grounds for rejecting the Hwang Geum Joo district court's strained
mischaracterization of the act of state-sponsored forced prostitution as an
abusive interchange of power between states. This constitutional question
need not be reached in the circumstances of Hwang Geum Joo, however,
because Japan's signing of treaties that establish property rules for women's
bodies acts as estoppel to any claim to a purported sovereign right to set
liability rules for women's bodies.
V. CONCLUSION
The difficulties with the D.C. District Court's ruling in Hwang Geum
Joo are clear whether the rationale is the orthodox commercial activity inquiry
consistent with legislative intent and court precedents detailed in Part Im.C;
treaty obligations; or the Thirteenth Amendment. States should not be able to
cloak practices of commodified sexual slavery akin to that for which private
actors are often castigated behind a claim of sovereign prerogative, effectively
asserting a de minimis liability rule for the bodily integrity of those harmed by
their vast destructive power. De minimis liability rules impose high costs to
both international and domestic rules of law. First, de minimis liability rules
impose no deterrent to future similar conduct. For example, the rape centers
during the Bosnian conflict exhibit troubling parallels to the "comfort
stations" of Imperial Japan.169 Second, de minimis liability rules signal
powerfully that the violated entitlement is of no value, legitimizing gross
violations of human rights. A decision that applies the mandates of law
impartially, rather than straining to avoid applying the law for political
167. E.g., Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944) (upholding conviction of
defendant who forced women with beatings or threat of beatings into prostitution at roadhouses for
peonage based on involuntary servitude); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1917)
(upholding conviction for peonage against a defendant who lured a woman on the promise of domestic
employment, to his brothel, where he forced her to work).
168. Katyal, supra note 117, at 791, 796-813 (quoting an 1883 writing by abolitionist, the
Reverend Charles Olcutt).
169. YosHM, supra note 2, at 19.
[Vol. 27: 395
2002] De Minimis Liability Rules for Sexual Slavery 421
reasons would create a more coherent and principled jurisprudence, and lend
needed legal support to the vital work of staunching future tragedies.

